Prompted by an actual case of potentially life-threatening infusion pump malfunction, we investigated the effects of wire breakage(s) within the syringe size sensor circuit in a Graseby 3400 infusion pump.The circuit wires within the sensor were systematically broken.The syringe sizes recognised by the sabotaged circuit and the actual sizes of syringes inserted into the pump were compared.Thirty-eight per cent of the possible wire breakages resulted in a smaller syringe size being recognized, causing the infusion rate to be too fast, and 38% of the possible wire breakage resulted in a larger syringe size being recognized, causing the infusion rate to be too slow.The volume delivered for each different size of Terumo syringe as a function of distance travelled by the plunger was measured.The errors ranged from 0.4 to 2.6 times that of the expected rate.Only 1.3% of the possible wire breakage(s) were recognised as errors by the pump.The infusion rates were not affected in 22.5% of the cases.Wire breakage within the syringe size sensor in infusion pumps is yet another potential source of infusion error, with important safety implications.
Syringe pumps are widely used in anaesthesia, intensive care, and other acute care practices. It is common to see several pumps infusing concurrently in a patient. Increasingly, home patients are also being medicated with infusion devices. Unfortunately, these precision pumps can malfunction, one of the most dangerous of which is unrecognised infusion rate error.
In a liver transplantation patient, a 60 ml syringe (Terumo Corporation, Tokyo, Japan) containing potassium chloride solution was placed in a Graseby (SIMS Graseby, Watford, Herts, U.K.) 3400 pump set to run at 200 ml/h. The pump had been preprogrammed to accept Terumo syringes. Although the screen displayed 200 ml/h, the syringe plunger movement appeared much faster. The clinician stopped the pump and examined the screen carefully to find that the syringe had been incorrectly recognised as 20 ml. Fortunately, since the potassium chloride concentration was dilute, no adverse effect occurred.
The incident was reported to the Hong Kong Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD), whose engineers took the syringe pump apart and found a wire breakage in the syringe size sensor. They then checked all of the syringe pumps in the institution to ensure no similar problems existed.
As this problem has not been reported before, we systematically examined the consequences of similar wire breakages in the syringe sensor circuit of this pump.
METHODS
The engineer from the Hong Kong EMSD removed the cover of the defective Graseby 3400 syringe pump and found no obvious problem. Stripping of the insulation on one of the wires of the size sensor, however, revealed a break in that wire ( Figure 1 ). Great care was taken to ensure that during removal of the insulation, the wire within was not damaged.
Next, we systematically disconnected each possible combination of one or more of the six parallel wires ( Figure 1) , and checked the apparent syringe size measured by the pump when Terumo syringes of sizes 5, 10, 20, 30 and 60 ml were inserted.
To take into account the situation in which a wire connection may be intact but tenuous and subject to disconnection with movement, we tested the pump with wire fault(s) occurring prior to starting the pump, and also whilst the pump was operating correctly.
Since the infusion rate is really determined by the speed at which the syringe plunger is pushed by the pump (which determines the desired speed based on the detected syringe size and the pre-programmed inside diameter of a particular brand), we also measured the volume delivered for each different size of Terumo syringe as a function of distance travelled by the plunger, and used this to determine the ratio of incorrect to correct infusion rates based on syringe sizes.
No other brand of syringe was tested. Table 1 shows the consequences of breakage in one or more of the wires. Not shown in Table 1 is that when there was a fault in wires 1,5, and/or 6, the pump always read 20 ml. Moreover, a 20 ml syringe was never misread. As an example, if wire 2 were broken, a 10 ml syringe would be recognised as 20 ml.
RESULTS
The six wires in question could assume 2 6 =64 permutations of intactness and breakage. All permutations but one (all wires intact) were abnormal. Each of the 63 abnormal permutations could be combined with one of five (5, 10, 20, 30, 60 ml) possible syringe sizes for a total of 63 x 5, or 315, situations. Overall, the Graseby 3400 recognised a syringe size smaller than the actual one in 120 (38.1%), and a size bigger than the actual one in 120 (38.1%), of those situations. The signal "System Invalid" appropriately appeared in only 4 (1.3%) of the 315 situations. The correct syringe sizes were recognised in 71 (22.5%) of the 315 situations. Note that we do not have any information on which wire or wires are more likely to break, or whether it is less likely for more than one wire to break.
When the wire was broken while the pump was running, the pump stopped with an audible alarm and a display "Clamp Open" on the screen. When that occurred, we did what most practitioners normally do -pressed the alarm disable button, opened the clamp and closed it again. With that, the pump resumed operation at the potentially erroneous rate as presented in Table 2 .
The length to volume ratios of the 5 ml, 10 ml, 20 ml, 30 ml and 60 ml Terumo syringes are shown in Table 2 , which also shows the ratio of the erroneous to the correct infusion rates based on syringe sizes.
DISCUSSION
This is, as far as we are aware, the first report of the 56 more permutations (from this point down) From the point down, the pump recognises all in which at least one of wires 1, 5, and 6 is broken syringes as 20 ml, and is therefore correct only when a 20 ml syringe is actually used
The above permutations are based on an intact wire 1, an intact wire 5, and an intact wire 6. If any one (or two or all) of wire 1, wire 5, and wire 6 is broken (details not shown), the pump will constantly read 20 ml. Errors are shown in bold. I=intact, B=broken, C.C.=clamp closed, C.O.=clamp opened, S.I.=syringe invalid consequences of wire breakage in a precision infusion pump syringe size recognition circuit. Terumo (and most makes of) syringes are designed such that each capacity larger also has a larger diameter. The syringe size sensor detects syringe size by the amount of lever rotation, as detected by three optical sensors. For each syringe size, the range of lever rotation is reasonably wide so that most brands of syringes of the same size will be recognised correctly, even if their diameters are slightly different. Since the speed at which the syringe plunger is pushed determines the infusion rate, and is calculated within the pump based on the syringe internal diameter, it is important to use the same brand of syringe as the one preprogrammed (by the user) into the pump (which has pre-installed data on seven popular brands), a point emphasised in the user manual. For a certain infusion rate, the syringe plunger would push a smaller syringe faster than it would for larger ones. Hence, if the pump misinterprets a syringe as smaller than the one in use, the infusion rate will be faster than the set value, and vice versa. In the Graseby 3400, circuit size sensor malfunction caused erroneous infusion rates ranging from 0.4 to 2.6 times that of the expected rate.
To appreciate how the delivered rate is affected in the presence of a wire breakage, one needs to refer to Table 1 , match the incorrect syringe size the pump readings to the actual syringe size used, then refer to Table 2 and find the ratio of erroneous rate to the cor-rect infusion rate. For example, if wire 1 is broken and a 60 ml syringe is used to deliver at a rate of 50 ml/h, the pump would misread the syringe as 20 ml and deliver the drug at an infusion rate of 2.6 times 50 ml/h, or 130 ml/h. These numbers may vary somewhat with syringes from other manufacturers because of small differences in syringe internal diameters.
Although we did not test the malfunctioning pump using other makes of syringes, we could not think of a reason why similar errors would not occur with the other brands, as the size sensing mechanism does not distinguish between syringes of different brands.
The Graseby 3400 syringe pump measures the size of the inserted syringe by the rotation of a plastic lever. The sensor does not detect a malfunction. As a result, the operator may not be alerted of a malfunction as the machine continues to "operate".
There is a further important flaw, in that when the wire is broken during use, the pump gives the incorrect alarm "Clamp Open". The manufacturer's manual for use of this pump states that the cause of this alarm is a problem with the syringe plunger clamp, and that the action should be to reposition the clamp on the syringe plunger. If this action is taken, the pump will restart at the incorrect rate.
Based on our finding, the Graseby 3400 does not appear to comply with the international standard for medical electrical equipment as related to the safety of infusion pumps, which requires that an audible alarm be initiated in the event of overinfusion and the equipment to either cease delivery of infusion or reduce the delivery rate to the "Keep Open Rate" 1 . This is not to say that the pump has not been carefully designed to meet this standard, or that the pump is more dangerous than other pumps, merely that with this type of (presumably rare) failure, it has not met the relevant requirements. As summarized in Table 1 , regardless of the site of the fault in the size sensor wiring, a 20 ml syringe will give the correct output. It should not however be concluded that a 20 ml syringe is always safe. In a complex device such as this one, the possibility remains that other heretofore unidentified malfunctions could occur even with a 20 ml syringe.
It is vital that when using one of these pumps the operator should ensure that the syringe recognised corresponds to the size and brand of syringe inserted, a point that is emphasised in the user manual and in the letter from Graseby responding to the problem. Failure to check that the recognised size and the actual size of the inserted syringe were the same resulted in the failure to detect the malfunction described in this case. Because the dim 2.5 mm fontsize syringe size display is partially hidden by the border of the display when viewed from above, the operator must check the pump at eye level even if that requires him/her to get on his/her knees or stoop down. In our liver transplant case, a total of seven syringe pumps stacked on top of one another were being used concurrently, with the faulty pump at the bottom. The case was complex and the patient's condition critical. In addition, the practitioners had to watch for potential problems in a plethora of machines, monitors, and ancillary equipment. It would be unreasonable to expect that under these circumstances the operator will always detect this kind of fault.
A sufficient level of safety requires robust design of the pump rather than relying on changes in operator practice. As syringe pumps are commonly used to infuse potent drugs, it is reasonable to expect that in the event of a single fault, they should fail to a safe state. Because the safest state would depend on the drug being infused, the best compromise seems to be that the pump should stop and emit an audible and visual alarm, with some indication as to what action should be taken.
There are reports of other pump misadventures, including gravitational siphoning 2-7 , errors caused by vertical displacements [4] [5] [6] 8, 9 , variations due to infusion line and syringe compliance 4,5,10-12 , and premature battery failure 13 . This study should be considered as an example of how an infusion pump may fail un-expectedly, rather than indicating that this particular failure mode is common, or confined to this brand of pump.
This case and study highlight the importance of periodically checking syringe pumps to ensure that the rate with which the syringe is emptying is consistent with the rate displayed, which in turn should be consistent with the programmed rate. For example, if one were to program the pump to run at a certain µg/kg/min, one should also calculate how fast that would be in ml/h so that any mistake could be quickly identified.
Syringe pumps are complex devices and may fail in many different ways. Regular service may prevent and detect malfunctions that are not immediately obvious to the operators. In our case the heavily used pump was in a regular service program, but had not been recently serviced, which makes it unlikely that the wire was damaged during the routine service. In places where regular servicing is not possible, obscure malfunctions may occur more frequently, and the operator must be even more vigilant to ensure that the correct syringe make and sizes are recognised, and that the infusion rate is as expected.
Due to the number of unexpected ways in which a pump may fail, a more general solution to an unanticipated mode of pump failure would be the addition of a distal flow sensor to monitor the pump output.
